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The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative 
of the University of Maryland 
School of Law’s Law & Health 
Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes 
a feature article, a Calendar of 
upcoming events, and a case 
presentation and commentary by 
local experts in bioethics, law, 
medicine, nursing, or related 
disciplines. 
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On November 30, 2010, over 200 individuals attended the Mary-land Health Care Ethics Commit-
tee Network's (MHECN’s) symposium on 
medical futility and Maryland law at the 
University of Maryland, Baltimore cam-
pus. Medical futility typically refers to a 
type of conflict over end-of-life medical 
treatment, usually the type of treatment 
provided in a hospital’s intensive care 
unit. In these disputes, the patient almost 
never has capacity (sometimes referred 
to as competence) to understand and 
make treatment decisions. So, health care 
decisions are made by the patient’s sub-
stitute decision makers: whether patient-
appointed, court-appointed, or default. 
The paradigmatic medical futility dispute 
is one in which the surrogate requests 
aggressive treatment interventions for 
an imminently dying or catastrophically 
chronically ill patient. However, that 
patient’s providers consider such treat-
ment to be medically ineffective (i.e., 
unable to achieve the desired goal) and/
or ethically inappropriate. For example, 
patients over age 85 undergoing in-hospi-
tal cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
have only a 6% chance of surviving to 
hospital discharge. Those with pre-ex-
isting co-morbidities are even less likely 
to survive. And many of the very few 
that do survive have significantly poorer 
neurological and functional states than 
they did before cardiac arrest. In short, 
physicians are reluctant to pound on a 
patient’s chest, break ribs, and otherwise 
cause suffering and burdens, when there 
is no corresponding benefit to be gained. 
MEDICAL FUTILITY & MARYLAND LAW
When death is unavoidable and contin-
ued life-sustaining interventions can only 
make death more uncomfortable, provid-
ers frequently determine that palliative 
care (which focuses on the relief of pain, 
symptoms and stress of serious illness) is 
most appropriate. 
Fortunately, the vast majority of 
medical futility disputes are resolved 
through good communication. When the 
treatment team meets with the patient’s 
family (often on several occasions) 
and carefully explains the prognosis, 
they almost always reach consensus. 
Toward this end, palliative care teams 
have made progress at some hospitals. 
Still, in a small but significant subset of 
cases, conflict remains intractable. The 
conference focused primarily upon these 
intractable cases and whether Maryland’s 
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) is 
effective in providing ethical resolution. 
The HCDA provides that life-sustaining 
medical treatment (such as dialysis, a 
ventilator, artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion) may be withheld or withdrawn 
from incapacitated patients only with the 
consent of an authorized decision maker, 
except in two circumstances: (1) where 
treatment is “medically ineffective” and/
or (2) where treatment is “ethically inap-
propriate.” But the statute defines these 
terms in such a narrow way that these 
exceptions do not apply to most futil-
ity disputes. Furthermore, even when 
these exceptions do apply, the statute still 
requires providers to continue complying 
with treatment decisions unless or until 
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medical futility disputes.
Speakers at the November 30 sympo-
sium described alternatives to Mary-
land’s HCDA. Charlie Sabatino, J.D., 
Director of the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Commission on Law and Aging, 
reviewed state laws related to medical 
futility. One example is Texas’s law, 
which allows physicians to withhold or 
withdraw treatment considered “ethi-
cally inappropriate” after a period of 
ten days, providing that certain due 
process standards are met. 
Lawrence Schneiderman, M.D., 
Professor Emeritus in the Department 
of Family and Preventive Medicine  
and Adjunct Professor in the Depart-
ment of Medicine at the University 
of California, San Diego, described 
the approach taken by a consortium 
of California hospitals. They sought a 
community standard of medical futility 
among local hospitals. University of 
California San Diego (UCSD) Medical 
Center adopted the resulting majority 
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the patient is transferred to another 
provider or facility. Since such trans-
fer sites are almost never found, the 
statute effectively requires providers 
to comply with surrogate requests for 
aggressive curative treatment that they 
consider non-beneficial, burdensome, 
and even cruel.
A survey conducted by MHECN 
in 2010 by hospital attorneys, risk 
managers, and ICU physicians re-
vealed that physicians comply with 
surrogate requests for medically inef-
fective treatment for dying patients 
due, in part, to fear of being sued. 
Furthermore, there are varying inter-
pretations of the HCDA that create 
inconsistencies in end-of-life decision-
making from one patient and health 
care provider to the next. In short, the 
“medically ineffective” and “ethi-
cally inappropriate” provisions in the 
HCDA—either due to the way the law 
is written or how it is interpreted and 
applied—do not provide an adequate 
mechanism for resolving intractable 
Medical Futility 
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community standard, which defines 
medical futility in their institutional 
policy as: “Any treatment without a 
realistic chance of providing an effect 
that the patient would ever have the 
capacity to appreciate as a benefit, 
such as merely preserving the physi-
ologic functions of a permanently 
unconsciousness patient, or has no 
realistic chance of achieving the medi-
cal goal of returning the patient to a 
level of health that permits survival 
outside the acute care setting of UCSD 
Medical Center.” UCSD also offers 
a process for compassionate dispute 
resolution and effective comfort care. 
This policy defines the professional 
standard of practice at UCSD Medical 
Center and serves to inform the public 
and as a guideline for the courts. A 
hospital could also adopt a minority 
standard in which it defines futility 
REPLACE THE SURROGATE?
A separate Maryland Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) provision may be of some use in intractable futility 
disputes between a surrogate and health care providers. When a surrogate makes a treatment decision that clearly 
contradicts what the patient would have wanted, the provider need not comply with that decision. The HCDA 
provides: “Any person authorized to make health care decisions for another under this section shall base those 
decisions on the wishes of the patient and, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the patient's best 
interest.” In other words, surrogates must make decisions that reflect the patient’s values, preferences, or best inter-
ests. Otherwise, they act outside the scope of their authority. Surrogates who are not faithful agents can and should 
be replaced. While effective and functional in some cases, surrogate replacement is hardly a complete solution to 
medical futility disputes. Most patients have not completed any advance care planning. Of the 34% of Maryland-
ers who have completed advance directives, those directives are usually unavailable when needed. And even when 
available, those directives usually fail to speak to the patient’s current clinical circumstances. In short, there is often 
no evidence of patient preferences. Consequently, it is impossible to demonstrate any contradiction between those 
preferences and surrogate decisions. While we know, statistically, that few of us would want to live in an extremely 
compromised condition, particularly if cognitively unaware, providers often do not know what any particular pa-
tient is willing to live with. In such cases, there are rarely grounds to replace a surrogate requesting treatment that 
providers determine is inappropriate.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, JD
differently and/or chooses not to limit 
life-sustaining treatment. Accordingly, 
it should declare this as its profession-
al standard of practice, formalize it as 
policy to inform the public as well as 
a guideline for the courts. Importantly, 
such a hospital should also accept 
transferred patients desiring treatments 
considered medically futile at other 
hospitals.
In the afternoon sessions at the 
November 30th symposium, attendees 
shared their ideas and suggestions for 
how to improve conflict resolution 
related to medical futility disputes. 
Most participants seemed to agree 
that revisions to the Maryland HCDA 
are in order. Providers need to be able 
to “stand up” for their patients. The 
tough work is designing a dispute 
resolution mechanism that can act with 
the real-time speed these cases de-
mand, yet include sufficient safeguards 
to ensure due process protections like 
neutral and unbiased adjudication. 
“Next steps” based on round table dis-
cussions from the November 30 sym-
posium are currently being explored 
by University of Maryland School of 
Law professors Diane Hoffmann, J.D., 
M.S. and Jack Schwartz, J.D., and 
Maryland Assistant Attorney General 
Paul Ballard, J.D.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, JD
Law Professor 
Widener University 
Wilmington, Delaware
www.thaddeuspope.com
A version of this article was reprinted 
with permission from the United  
Seniors of Maryland Newsletter,  
January, 2011.
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In the early twentieth century, defining death as the cessation or absence of life was 
straightforward.  A person was dead 
when his heart stopped beating 
and air no longer flowed through 
his lungs.  A clinical test of death 
involved either listening for a 
heartbeat or placing a mirror in front 
of a patient’s mouth to see if fog 
appeared.  Although these clinical 
techniques were imperfect, and 
occasionally resulted in premature 
burial, there was general agreement 
that death was determined by the 
permanent and irreversible cessation 
of cardiopulmonary function.  
Beginning in the 1960s, however, 
advances in life-sustaining 
technologies made it possible not 
only to resuscitate people whose 
respiration and heartbeat had ceased, 
but also to artificially maintain 
their cardiopulmonary function in 
the absence of brain function.  In 
recognition of that possibility, the 
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard 
Medical School recommended in 
1968 that patients on life support, 
who had sustained irreversible and 
complete brain damage, be declared 
dead (Ad Hoc Comm. of Harvard 
Medical School to Examine the 
Definition of Brain Death, 1968).  
There were two practical implications 
of this recommendation.  First, 
it allowed for the withdrawal of 
expensive life support from patients 
the Committee believed would 
no longer benefit; and second, it 
facilitated organ transplantation by 
increasing the supply of organs from 
the newly dead (Shaw & Miller, 
2010).
In the aftermath of the Harvard 
Committee’s report, the “whole 
brain” definition of death gained 
important legal grounding. The 
President’s Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research accepted the whole brain 
criteria in 1981, arguing (in the face 
of some controversy) that because 
the brain is the command center 
for the whole organism, when it 
dies, so too does the organism (The 
President’s Commission, 1981). That 
same year, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws incorporated the whole brain 
definition of death into the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (UDDA), 
which defined death as either 
“irreversible cessation of circulatory 
and respiratory functions” or 
“irreversible cessation of all functions 
of the entire brain, including the 
brain stem” (Uniform Determination 
of Death Act, 2008). Today, all 
fifty states legally recognize both 
cardio-pulmonary and whole-brain 
definitions of death.* 
Despite what appears to be 
nationwide agreement on the legal 
standards for determining death, some 
scholars are now expressing concern 
that, in practice, cardiopulmonary 
and whole-brain criteria are simply 
legal fictions to increase the number 
of available organs for transplantation 
(Shaw & Miller, 2010).  In the 
context of cardiopulmonary criteria 
for death, critics argue that the 
working definition has changed 
over time from one based on the 
impossibility of resuscitation, to 
one based on the decision not to 
resuscitate. 
In the 1990s, several hospitals 
began practicing controlled 
organ donation after circulatory 
determination of death (DCDD).  
These protocols, which continue 
today, involve removing life-
sustaining treatment based on a 
patient or his proxy’s wishes, and 
then waiting a set amount of time 
for the heart to stop beating before 
procuring organs. Critics argue that 
in these circumstances, death is 
based on an affirmative decision not 
to resuscitate the individual, rather 
than the impossibility of cardiac 
resuscitation or the irreversibility 
of cardiopulmonary function.  
According to some scholars, DCDD 
protocols fudge the cardiopulmonary 
definition of death by declaring the 
imminently dying patient’s organs 
available for transplant before the 
patient is actually dead (Evans, 2007).
Many scholars also have criticized 
whole brain death criteria on the 
ground that it, too, is misconceived 
and open to manipulation. These 
critics challenge the claim that total 
brain death signals the loss of an 
organism’s integrative functioning.  
Relying on scientific advances, they 
proffer evidence that important 
biological functions, including 
gestation and some brain functions, 
can continue in patients considered 
dead under whole brain criteria 
(Halevy, 2001; Shewmon, 2001; 
Shewmon, 2009). In response to this 
evidence, the President’s Council 
on Bioethics issued a white paper 
in 2008 that acknowledged the 
shortcomings of whole brain death 
criteria and the need to reassess it 
(The President’s Council, 2008).  In 
the meantime, critics argue, “the 
declaration of death for most patients 
diagnosed as dead on the basis of 
neurological criteria is inconsistent 
with the UDDA, which requires 
irreversible cessation of all function 
of the entire brain (Shaw & Miller, 
2010, p. 552).”
If the critics are correct that our 
modern definitions of death are 
legal fictions to accommodate organ 
transplantation, then the time has 
come for all of us to consider whether 
these are legal fictions we can live 
with (like the notion that corporations 
are persons), or whether our story 
needs revisions. 
THE PHILOSOPHER'S CORNER: DETERMINING DEATH
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Leslie Meltzer Henry, JD
Assistant Professor
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School of Law
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Student 
University of Maryland 
School of Law 
* Two states, New Jersey and New 
York, permit patients to object to 
neurological declarations of death 
based on the patient’s religious views. 
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A (2010). 
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CASE PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered 
by an ethics committee and an analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both 
encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit other cases that their 
ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and 
others in the case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless 
otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify the submitter or institution. We may 
also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to 
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University 
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE STUDY FROM A  
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
A 17 year old female is admitted to the medical ward of a com-munity hospital for malnutri-
tion and weight loss due to anorexia 
nervosa. A nurse on the floor contacts 
the ethics committee to inquire about 
the ethical standard of care for such 
patients. The nurse was told by the 
patient's physician and nursing super-
visor to interact minimally with the 
patient to avoid being "manipulated" 
by her, and to use restraints as neces-
sary to ensure that the patient receives 
the ordered tube feedings via nasogas-
tric tube. The nurse who requested the 
ethics consultation believes that it is 
the nurse's duty to attempt to establish 
a therapeutic bond with her patient 
whenever possible, and that actively 
force feeding the patient—including 
with the use of hand restraints—will 
thwart trust-building and may do 
more harm than good.
COMMENTS FROM  
A NURSE CASE MANAGER
My experience as a registered nurse 
leaves me with many questions of 
process after reading of the anorexic, 
manipulative patient whose nurse 
was ordered to restrain and force 
feed her. The first thought that comes 
to mind when reading the scenario 
is the lack of empathy that is being 
directed and instituted towards this 
particular patient. It is imperative that 
empathy and compassion be at the 
forefront when deciding matters of 
importance and impact for others. The 
manner in which we approach decision 
making is crucial in forming a trusting 
caregiver patient relationship as well 
as developing the patients’ confidence 
in medical science. The interpersonal 
relationships that we build in return 
create a therapeutic milieu to enhance 
and nurture the healing process. In 
cases where medical professionals 
are making decisions for those whose 
judgments may be impaired, empathy 
for and understanding of the condition 
being treated must be applied.  
Throughout the healthcare spectrum 
all decisions should be weighed 
carefully with this premise close to 
mind, in order to professionally and 
ethically provide the optimal care that 
is warranted and deserved by those 
entrusted to our services.
 A seventeen year-old female 
diagnosed with anorexia nervosa being 
treated in a community hospital would 
most likely be an inappropriate setting 
to institute the extreme measures the 
doctor and nurse manager are calling 
for. A community hospital, in most 
circumstances, would not provide the 
expertise needed to adequately address 
the patient’s medical, emotional, as 
well as psychological needs. The 
needs of this young woman would be 
better served at a specialty hospital 
or facility with physicians and nurses 
Cont. on page 6
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who are trained and experienced with 
the array of complicated medical as 
well as psychological aspects of this 
devastating disease. A full history of 
the patient, previous treatment with 
regard to successes and failures along 
with the course of progression the 
disease has taken is needed to best 
treat the underlying causes of anorexia 
nervosa. There are many similar 
aspects to a population suffering from 
anorexia, but each individual’s disease 
has an identity and trigger of its own.   
Isolation of a patient does not help us 
gain insight on what the root causes 
may be.
The patient at this time is not 
legally able to make her own medical 
decisions because of her age but 
her autonomy should be valued and 
explored.  The input of her family 
should also have impact and guidance 
on the course of her treatment. A 
comprehensive plan would be in the 
best interest of this patient, devised 
by all parties involved in her care. 
More facts on the medical condition 
of the patient’s health status would 
be necessary to make a confident 
decision. The determination of her 
condition as stable or critical would 
be a vital piece of information. The 
duration of her illness would also 
determine how fragile her organ 
systems may be. There are numerous 
complications associated with 
anorexia which would make frequent 
observation essential in order to 
support the best interest of the patient. 
The patient’s rights as a human being 
must be at the forefront in any aspect 
of care. 
 My concerns lie with the physician 
and nurse manager who appear to 
be overstepping their professional 
boundaries and scope of practice. 
There seems to be an air of 
stereotyping and “one-size-fits-all” 
approach that is dictating the doctor’s 
order set. Have the current standards 
of care been investigated? Have they 
been discussed with the patient and 
her family? A referral to a trained 
colleague specializing in or having 
experience in the treatment of anorexia 
nervosa would be the initial step a 
prudent practitioner would utilize 
in this particular patient’s plan and 
execution of care. 
 I believe the player who has shown 
the highest ethical standards and 
critical thinking is the nurse who 
advocated for the rights of her patient. 
Her first appropriate action was to 
question the therapeutic effectiveness 
of the orders she received for isolating 
and restraining a manipulative patient. 
An act of conscious professionalism 
followed and resulted in a decision 
to consult the ethics committee. The 
culture of nursing is patient-centered, 
focusing on the individual needs of 
each patient. The nurse fulfilled her 
oath by questioning the orders she has 
received and seeking further expertise 
on the matter at hand. 
Our duty is to find the motivation 
behind the young woman’s behavior, 
not to label, isolate, violate and 
restrain her. These extreme measures 
are to be weighed carefully with 
prudent judgment, taking into 
account what is in the best interest 
of the young woman. The potential 
benefits versus the burdens of our 
actions must be fully examined 
before an individual’s rights are 
compromised. An ethical analysis 
utilizing the principles of patient 
autonomy, medical beneficence and 
justice or fairness is imperative before 
complying with the physician’s and 
nurse manager’s orders. 
Elizabeth Whelan Todd, RN
Case Manager for the Balance 
Center and Neuroday Program 
at DGH for Shore Health System, 
Member of Shore Health System Ethics 
Committee
COMMENTS FROM A 
PEDIATRIC INTENSIVIST 
& PEDIATRIC CRITICAL 
CARE NURSE
Good medical ethics first and 
foremost requires good medicine, 
and good medicine requires adequate  
medical knowledge as well as good 
communication.  Knowledge of 
the psychopathology of anorexia 
nervosa and the pathophysiology of 
starvation are essential to the proper 
treatment of this young lady.  Nurses 
are taught to encourage patients to 
express their feelings and to validate 
them. However, the therapeutic 
relationship as perceived by the nurse 
is not necessarily the one which is 
appropriate in this situation.  The 
nurse caring for the patient is 
suffering “moral distress” because 
the prescribed minimal interaction 
is in conflict with her perception of 
her duty to establish a therapeutic 
relationship.  Anorexia nervosa is 
best treated in a specialized unit, 
usually of a psychiatric facility, 
with staff who have experience and 
expertise in treating eating disorders.  
However, most units of this nature 
will not accept patients with acute 
life-threatening conditions which 
may occur as a result of anorexia, 
such as electrolyte abnormalities 
or cardiovascular compromise.  
Therefore, before definitive treatment 
of the eating disorder can begin, 
including establishment of therapeutic 
relationships, the patient must be 
stabilized in an acute care medical 
facility.  It is very likely that most 
medical floors in community hospitals 
do not have extensive experience with 
teenagers with eating disorders. 
It is a characteristic of anorexia 
nervosa that patients frequently refuse 
to engage with treatment, in spite 
of danger to health and life. This 
is so characteristic of the disorder 
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 5
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that it is described in the DSM-IV, 
immediately following the list of 
criteria given above, as follows: 
“The individual is often brought 
to professional attention by family 
members after marked weight loss 
(or failure to make expected weight 
gains) has occurred.  Individuals with 
Anorexia Nervosa frequently lack 
insight into, or have considerable 
denial of, the problem and may be 
unreliable historians. It is therefore 
often necessary to obtain information 
from parents or other outside sources 
to evaluate the degree of weight loss 
and other features of the illness” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). Treatment is sometimes given 
compulsorily, although there is much 
variation in its use (The Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, 1992). 
Competence to make treatment 
decisions is an important issue to 
consider when the patient is at risk 
and compulsory treatment is being 
contemplated, but there is very little 
research to help in the understanding 
of this area in anorexia nervosa. The 
treatment of anorexia nervosa often 
involves implementing a re-feeding 
program that may require the use of 
strict supervision, enforcement of 
prescribed dietary plans, prevention of 
exercising or purging, and naso-gastric 
or gastrostomy tube feeding. All these 
measures restrict freedom and can be 
experienced as intrusive and coercive 
by the patients, their families, and 
the clinical staff. Those involved can, 
for these reasons, feel concern about 
imposing treatment irrespective of 
whether they believe it to be effective 
(Beumont & Vandereycken, 1998).
Patients with anorexia nervosa often 
refuse to cooperate with treatment, 
in spite of danger to health and life.  
They often lack insight into, or have 
considerable denial of, the problem.  
They may be extremely manipulative, 
and may try to circumvent the 
measures instituted to establish 
nutrition.  All of this can cause moral 
distress in those whose task it is to 
implement these measures. 
There is also evidence that insight 
may be further compromised by the 
malnutrition itself, and that until the 
patient is in a better nutritional state, 
there may be even less understanding 
and insight than there would be 
otherwise. In order for this nurse not 
to feel moral distress, she needs to 
understand the nature of the disease 
and the treatment.  If the degree 
of malnutrition is immediately 
life threatening (electrolye or 
cardiovascular abnormalities), then 
the priority of treatment is establishing 
effective correction, by any means 
possible.  The nurses caring for the 
patient need to understand the nature 
of the illness and their role in caring 
for this young lady before psychiatric 
care is instituted.  In order for that 
to happen, the nursing staff should 
discuss the priorities and essential 
elements of this patient’s care with the 
attending physician, psychiatrist, and 
others to implement (and understand) 
a safe and appropriate plan for this 
patient.  This will also enable staff to 
explore the difficulties and distress 
perceived by the nursing staff, and 
to reassure the nursing staff that they 
are not providing “cruel and unusual” 
care.   
This, of course, is not to say that 
the nurse caring for the patient should 
be abrupt or appear uncaring in any 
way.  The necessary procedures to 
restore physical health to the patient 
so that she can begin her journey to 
mental health should, of course, be 
carried out in a sympathetic manner, 
and any distressing procedures 
should be explained and described 
to the patient as they are being 
implemented.  However, the risk of 
the patient subverting the procedures 
by entangling the nurse in long 
negotiations is a very real one, as 
patients with anorexia can be very 
good at manipulating their caregivers.
The issue of capacity for decision-
making is a complex one in this 
case.  Although the patient is 17 
years old, and not of legal age for 
medical decision making (assuming 
she is not an emancipated minor), 
she is certainly old enough that her 
assent should be sought for most 
treatment decisions.  However, in 
the face of psychiatric disease which 
limits insight and is associated with 
denial, she most likely would not have 
capacity to make decisions for consent 
or assent surrounding the treatment 
of the disease (regardless of age).  
Psychiatric input for establishment 
of capacity would be crucial.  Again, 
as the nature of the disease involves 
denial or lack of insight, there would 
be no ethical obligation to obtain 
her assent to treatment, and indeed, 
good ethics as good medicine would 
demand nutrition with or without her 
assent.  Just as one would not let a 
young child dictate their care, and a 
good parent would implement those 
things necessary to ensure the health 
of their child, the establishment of 
effective medical therapy in this case 
is the first priority.  Similarly, we 
would not allow a suicidal teenager 
to proceed in their quest to end their 
life, no matter how distressing the 
intervention may appear to the child.
It seems to us that to optimally 
resolve this case, a meeting should 
take place including the attending 
physician, the psychiatric consultant, 
nursing leadership and the nurse who 
requested the ethics consultation, as 
well as any other nurses caring for 
the patient who have questions or 
concerns regarding her care.  The plan 
of care, both acutely in the community 
hospital, as well as ultimately, in 
a psychiatric facility, should be 
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explained in detail to the nursing 
staff, and they should have adequate 
time and opportunity to express their 
concerns.  The physician staff and 
nursing leadership should likewise be 
afforded the opportunity to express 
their concerns regarding the risk of 
the patient subverting her care, and 
a mutually agreed-upon plan of care 
should be formulated. 
Charlotte Glicksman, MD
Pediatric Intensivist
Janie Ginsburg, RN, BSN, CCRN
Pediatric Critical Care Nurse
The Herman and Walter Samuelson 
Children’s Hospital at Sinai 
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore
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COMMENTS FROM 
SHEPPARD-PRATT ETHICS 
COMMITTEE
The patient with severe anorexia 
nervosa (AN) often poses a complex 
and daunting challenge, even in 
settings with significant experience 
in treating such individuals.  The 
illness is often conceptualized in 
a biopsychosocial frame with a 
multifactorial etiology.  The core 
symptom of AN is a significant self-
imposed starvation coupled with a 
profound, morbid fear of fatness in 
the context of an individual who does 
not or cannot acknowledge this as a 
problem.  Complicating matters are 
a range of psychiatric and medical 
comorbidities which propel the death 
rate to 5% per decade from the point 
of diagnosis, the highest of any mental 
illness.  Since the earliest references 
to the illness in the mid 1600’s, and 
the more modern characterizations 
by Gull and Lasegue in the 19th 
century, eating disorders have been 
the subject of extensive research 
in psychiatry, clinical psychology, 
somatic medicine, and more recently, 
ethics.  The question at the heart of the 
ethical consideration is to what extent 
a person should be allowed to make 
an autonomous decision to starve, 
and what constitutes an ethically-
sound approach to the seriously 
compromised patient with AN.  So 
began the discussion of our ethics 
committee stimulated by the case 
presentation above.  We grappled with 
the case and its nuances, leading us 
to reaffirm some basic principles, and 
then ask some broader questions.
Pertinent Basic Principles in the 
Treatment of AN 
1. Treatment of the severely ill 
patient with AN (absent extreme 
physical compromise and/or 
need for cardiac monitoring) best 
occurs in specialty eating disorder 
settings with a clinical staff with 
significant experience in eating 
disorders.  Often, highly resistant 
patients will autonomously eat and 
refeed in such settings without the 
need for involuntary (physically 
forced) feeding.
2. Involuntary feeding of patients 
with AN should only be used 
as an absolute last resort in 
patients with physical and 
cognitive deterioration and 
compromise, and only after 
significant attempts have been 
made to repeatedly encourage 
autonomous feeding.  Involuntary 
feeding itself, via nasogastric tube 
or hyperalimentation through 
central or venous access, carries 
significant potential for morbidity 
and mortality. These risks must 
be carefully balanced with the 
risks of chronic emaciation and 
nutritional deprivation for the 
individual patient.  
3. Repeated attempts should be 
made to engage the physically 
compromised, resistant patient 
through development of a 
therapeutic alliance.  This often 
requires great patience, empathy, 
and a willingness to tolerate 
repeated rejections by the patient 
of the efforts of caregivers to 
provide help.  While power 
struggles should be avoided, only 
“minimal interaction” with the 
patient is unlikely to facilitate 
alliance and is not advised.  In 
forced treatment situations, the 
patient should receive ongoing 
explanation of the rationale for the 
prescribed treatment.
4. Education of all providers is 
essential.  In the case presented, 
the nurse has made a sound 
judgment to engage the ethics 
committee in discussion of the 
case.  Efforts should be pursued 
to educate the nurse about the 
need for and the reasons for the 
proposed treatment, as well as 
the risks to the patient of not 
providing the treatment.  In a 
culture that overemphasizes the 
importance of thinness, some 
caregivers tend to minimize the 
extent of the patient’s illness and 
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thus struggle with exerting control 
through paternalistic measures.  
Splits and disagreements within 
the treatment team will generally 
lead to a poor outcome.  Input 
from a consultation-liaison 
psychiatrist might be indicated in 
such a situation.
Autonomy versus Paternalism
In discussion of this case, our ethics 
group grappled with the complex 
interface between the autonomous 
right to choose one’s course in life, 
and the paternalistic treatment of 
individuals with cognitive impairment, 
distorted thinking, and physical 
deterioration. What constitutes 
autonomy?  Is a patient’s decision to 
starve a truly autonomous decision? Is 
the patient acting under the influence 
of a brain disorder which distorts 
thinking in the area of body shape, 
weight, and appearance?  To what 
extent do patients have a right to 
pursue the symptoms of AN if that is 
what they “want”? What behaviors 
are dangerous enough to warrant 
paternalism and involuntary treatment? 
Is the pursuit of compulsive exercise, 
or other compensatory behaviors 
such as vomiting, enough and to what 
degree must such behaviors exist?
In our final analysis, we agreed 
that there are not bright-line, 
definitive answers to such questions.  
Clearly, the nuances of each clinical 
presentation of treatment refusal in 
AN will require thoughtful and careful 
analysis of these issues going forward.
Harry Brandt, MD 
Director
Steven Crawford, MD 
Associate Director 
The Center for Eating Disorders 
at Sheppard Pratt
Members of 
Sheppard-Pratt Ethics Committee
COMMENTS FROM 
AN ATTORNEY WHO 
REPRESENTS CHILDREN 
WITH DISABILITIES
The two key legal questions presented 
in this case study are:
1. Is the 17 year old patient capable 
of providing informed consent 
and thus, informed refusal to the 
tube feedings and to the hand 
restraints?
2. Does the use of restraints in 
this situation comport with the 
requirements of the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) and the Joint Commission?
In answer to the first question, the 
general rule is that individuals under 
the age of 18 do not have the capacity 
to consent to medical treatment. 
Their parents or legal guardians 
provide informed consent or informed 
refusal on their behalf. Thus, unless 
it is an emergency or other specific 
situation covered by Maryland’s 
minors’ consent to treatment statutes, 
the patient’s parents must provide 
or withhold consent to the forced 
feedings (Health General Article 20-
101 et seq). In order to meet informed 
consent legal requirements, the parents 
must be told the child’s diagnoses, the 
proposed treatment, the alternatives to 
those treatments including the option 
of no treatment and the material risks 
of the proposed treatments and the 
alternatives. Even if the minor patient 
does not have the capacity to consent, 
it is good practice to also provide her 
with all of the information provided 
to her parents and to answer all of 
her questions about her treatment. 
Another important consideration for 
the clinicians to review is the extent 
to which the patient’s psychiatric 
impairment and/or medication regimen 
impairs her cognition and thus, her 
decision making capacity.
From an ethical perspective, the 
clinicians should work to preserve 
the patient’s autonomy to the greatest 
extent possible even if the patient does 
not have the legal capacity to consent. 
The patient is much more likely to 
be an active and willing participant 
in her treatment if she knows what 
is happening to her and why from a 
medical and psychiatric perspective. 
The direction from the physician 
and nursing supervisor to “interact 
minimally” with the patient, makes 
no legal or ethical sense. From a legal 
perspective, it could mean that vital 
information related to patient care 
will be missed and that the patient 
may be harmed as a result of this 
lack of information. From an ethical 
perspective, it greatly diminishes the 
patient’s autonomy by diminishing her 
participation and voice in her care. 
With respect to the second question, 
both CMS and the Joint Commission 
have requirements for the use of 
restraints in hospitals.  Standard 
PC.03.05.09  in the Comprehensive 
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals 
includes the definition of restraint 
and seclusion and also what is not 
a restraint. The Joint Commission 
follows the CMS definition of 
restraint, which is, in relevant part 
“[a]ny manual method, physical 
or mechanical device, material, or 
equipment that immobilizes or reduces 
the ability of a patient to move his or 
her arms, legs, body, or head freely” 
42 CFR 482.13(e)(1)(i).  The Case 
Study’s description clearly includes 
the authorization of the use of “hand 
restraints.” It is unclear from the case 
study whether the physician’s ordering 
of restraints under these circumstances 
meets the requirements established by 
either CMS or the Commission which 
are specific as to who can authorize 
restraint, the circumstances under 
which restraints can be authorized, the 
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11 (12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, Director of the Office for Human Research Protec-
tions, (topic TBA). Sponsored by the Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series.  Armstrong Build-
ing, West Lecture Hall, Hopkins medical campus (near E. Monument St. & N. Bond St.). For more in-
formation, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels  at mmartind@ 
jhsph.edu.
21  Practical Clinical Ethics: The ABC’s of Palliative Care. Sponsored by Harbor Hospital. Harbor Hospi-
tal, 3001 S. Hanover St. For more information, contact Marissa Popkin at 410-350-3552.
25 (12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Jim Lavery, MSc, PhD, research scientist in the Centre for Research on Inner 
City Health and Centre for Global Health Research, University of Toronto  (topic TBA). Sponsored 
by the Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series.  Armstrong Building, West Lecture Hall. For 
more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels  at 
mmartind@ jhsph.edu.
26  (12-1:00 p.m.) Informal discussion with Tom Tomlinson, PhD, Co-Director of Bioethics, Humanities 
& Society and Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University. Penn Center for Bioethics, 3401 
Market Street, Room 321, Philadelphia, PA. RSVP to spaebh@mail.med.upenn.edu. Call 215-898-
7136 for more information.
26 “Pain is a Four-Letter Word,” 5th Annual Bioethics Symposium. Sponsored by the Center for Practical 
Bioethics. Kansas City, MO. For more information, contact Cindy Leland at cleyland@practicalbio-
ethics.org. 
29 Clinical Ethics Consultation – The State of the Art. Sponsored by the Bioethics Network of Ohio. 
Dublin, Ohio (near Columbus). For more information, visit http://www.beno-ethics.org.
MAY
9 (12-1:30 p.m.) Speaker: Susan Reverby, PhD, Marion Butler McLean Professor in the History of 
Ideas; Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies, Wellesley College (topic TBA). Sponsored by the 
Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series. Wolfe W3008, Hopkins medical campus. For more in-
formation, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org, or contact Michelle Martin-Daniels  at mmartind@ 
jhsph.edu.
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length of time during which restraints 
may be used, and how often the 
patient must be reevaluated for the 
use of restraints. All staff members 
who authorize or use restraints must 
have specialized training in the use 
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of restraints. The Joint Commission’s 
Acute Medical and Surgical 
(Nonpsychiatric) Care restraint 
standards are found in Standards 
PC.03.05.01 through PC.03.05.19 
(effective July 1, 2009).
Ellen A. Callegary, Esq.
Callegary & Steedman, P.A.
Baltimore, MD
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter  11
CALENDAR OF EVENTS (cont'd)
JUNE
2-4 Canadian Bioethics Society 22nd Annual Conference, Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada. For 
more information, visit http://www.cbssaintjohn2011.org/.
6-10 Intensive Bioethics Course, Sponsored by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C. For more information, visit http://www.kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu.
15-17 “Harvard Clinical Bioethics Course.” Sponsored by the Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medi-
cal School. Boston, MA. For more information,contact Helena Martins at Helena_martins@hms.
harvard.edu.
20-24 Teaching Ethics Workshop, sponsored by the Center for Healthcare Ethics at Duquesne University, 
Pittsburgh, PA. For more information, visit http://www.duq.edu/chce, or e-mail tenhaveh@duq.edu. 
29 Primer for Health Care Ethics Committee Members, sponsored by Harbor Hospital’s Ethics Commit-
tee in Partnership with the Maryland Health Care Ethics Committee Network and the Center for Eth-
ics at Washington Hospital Center. Harbor Hospital, 3001 S. Hanover St., Baltimore, MD. For more 
information, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn, or contact Mary Barnes at mbarnes@law.
umaryland.edu.
JULY
22-23 Seventh Annual Pediatric Bioethics Conference, Sponsored by Seattle Children's Hospital, Bell Har-
bor International Conference Center, Seattle, WA. For more information, visit http://www.seattlechil-
drens.org/research/initiatives/bioethics/events/pediatric-bioethics-conference/.
22-24 Penn Conference on Clinical Neuroscience & Society. Sponsored by the Penn Center for Neurosci-
ence & Society. 3810 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA. For more information, visit http://neuroethics.
upenn.edu/index.php/events/clinical-conference, or e-mail conference@neuroethics.upenn.edu.
AUGUST
4-7 Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress. Sponsored by the Center for Values and Social Policy, 
University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO. For more information, visit http://www.colorado.
edu/philosophy/center/rome.
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